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Burgstahler and Dichev (BD) (Burgstahler, David, Ilia, Dichev, 1997. Earnings management to
avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23(1), 99–126.) and
Degorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (DPZ) (Degeorge, Franscois, Patel, Jayendu, Zeckhauser, Richard,
1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business 72(1), 1–33.) examine earnings
management among American firms by looking at actual distributions around critical thresholds.
Chinese firms must meet minimal ROE requirements if they are to have rights issues. Using a distri-
bution approach, we examine whether Chinese firms manipulate their earnings to meet the regula-
tory requirements. Our empirical findings indicate that Chinese firms indeed heavily engaged in
earnings management to meet the rights issue thresholds during the period 1994–2002. In addition,
we show that these firms changed their behavior in response to changes in regulatory requirements.
Furthermore, we analyse the pervasiveness of this practice and the means used in earnings manage-
ment at the relevant ROE thresholds. Our findings have direct policy implications for the China
Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC).
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Despite the perception that earnings management or earnings fabrication is a wide-
spread practice among China’s listed firms, not many empirical studies have been under-
taken to detect this practice and its pervasiveness in China.3 As an exception, Chen and
Yuan (2004) examine earnings management by China’s listed firms to meet the regulatory
requirement on return on equity (ROE) for rights issues. Using the industry-adjusted non-
operating income, these authors find that Chinese firms engaged in earnings management
to meet the minimum 10% ROE required for rights issues during the period 1996–1998.
They also find that such earnings management in anticipation of rights issues has a neg-
ative impact on the subsequent performance of the firms.
Unlike their study which covers a three-year period, we use a distribution approach to
examine the earnings management at two ROE thresholds that Chinese firms had to
exceed before they were allowed to raise new equity capital through rights issues for a
much longer period, 1994–2002. The distribution approach used is intuitive and direct.
It does not require the estimates on abnormal accounting accruals which are inevitably
noisy. Previous studies use the distribution approach mainly to deal with situations where
particular levels, such as zero earnings or zero earnings growth, are prominent, based on
the prospect theory. However, a regulatory standard is exogenously determined and is
more susceptible to management since earnings targets have to be met or exceeded.
The Chinese dataset is particularly suitable for a study using the distribution approach.
As mentioned earlier, the ROE threshold required for rights issues in China is exogenously
determined. In addition, the Chinese dataset allows us to detect the dynamic nature of
earnings management in response to regulatory changes. During the 1994–2002 period,
the rights issues threshold changed twice. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, this is
the first study using a distribution approach to examine earnings management in response
to regulatory changes.
Our study is of interest because China is the largest developing economy with a fast-
growing stock market which attracts the attention of researchers and potential investors
all over the world. For example, the ratio of China’s stock market capitalization to
GDP increased from 4% in 1992 to about 60% in 2002, and the investment accounts
increased from under 5 million to over 60 million during the same period. At the end of
2002, there were about 1200 firms listed on China’s two national stock exchanges, the3 There have been numerous scandals concerning manipulation of financial statements. For example, Hainan
Minyuan Modern Agricultural Development manipulated its 1996 financial report and boosted its net profit by
RMB540 million (see China Securities Daily, April 29, 2001). Hongguang, a Chengdu-based company, was found
guilty of manipulating its financial report in 1996 to get listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, (see
www.stock2000.com.cn). More recent cases include Yinguangxia, Zhengzhou Baiwen, KMK, Yorkpoint S&T
Co. etc. (see People’s Daily, December 23, 2001). A commentary in the China Securities Daily (October 5, 2001)
pointed out that earnings management and fabrication are so pervasive that they have shaken investor confidence
in China’s stock market.
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only established in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Now the trading volume in the Chinese
stock market is second only to Japan in Asia.
Using the distribution approach developed by BD (1997) and DPZ (1999), we find the
following. First, earnings management exists at ROE thresholds, namely, at 10% for the
period 1994–1998, 10% and 6% for the period 1999–2000, and 6% for the period 2001–
2002. Second, earnings management responds to changes in regulation. Third, earnings
management around the regulatory thresholds is very pervasive. Finally, the non-core
income4 appears to be an important means for earnings management in China. These find-
ings are consistent with Chen and Yuan (2004) in that Chinese-listed firms engage in earn-
ings management in order to raise new equity in the market. These findings also have
policy implications for the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC), the govern-
ment watchdog in securities markets. To restore investor confidence, CSRC is declaring
a war against widespread irregularities, including earnings management and earnings fab-
rication in the stock market.
The next section briefly reviews the relevant literature on earnings management. Section
3 describes the incentives of earnings management among Chinese-listed firms and the
changes to rights issue requirements in China. Sections 4–6 present our empirical results
and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
Earnings management has been studied extensively in the literature. According to
Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management occurs when managers use judgement
in financial reporting and structure transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. They also
identify three major motivations for earnings management: (1) to benefit from favourable
valuation in capital markets; (2) to fulfil contracts written in terms of accounting numbers;
and (3) to meet government regulations or stock exchange requirements.
Previous authors have identified the high level of discretion that managers have to influ-
ence accounting numbers, especially through many types of discretionary accruals.5 For
example, managers can manipulate, to a certain extent, the estimates on expected lives
and salvage values of fixed assets, obligations for pension benefits, deferred taxes, and losses
from bad debts. They also can choose among acceptable accounting methods, such as LIFO
or FIFO inventory valuation methods or the straight-line or accelerated depreciation meth-
ods, for reporting the same transactions. In addition, managers have a degree of discretion
in working capital management in deciding inventory levels, timing of inventory shipments
or purchases, and receivable policies. All these affect cost allocations and net revenues.
Moreover, managers can choose to make or defer expenditures, such as R&D, adver-
tising, and maintenance. Therefore, most studies on earnings management try to measure
abnormal accruals. Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1988), Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995)
have developed various models to estimate abnormal accruals. However, distinguishing4 Total net income = core income + non-core income. Non-core (or non-operating income) = investment
income + income from gains + income from government subsidy + other non-operating income.
5 See, for example, Teoh et al. (1998).
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noisy. Notably, Young (1999) finds that all these models have systematic errors in measur-
ing abnormal accruals.
BD (1997) and DPZ (1999) adopt an alternative approach to examine earnings manage-
ment. They argue that, at some thresholds, managers have strong incentives to engage in
earnings management. For example, managers may want to avoid a loss or negative earn-
ings growth, and they also may want to meet, or surpass, analysts’ earnings forecasts. Both
BD and DPZ examine the distribution of reported earnings around these points (thres-
holds). If there is no earnings management, the distribution around these points should
be smooth. However, consistent with the earnings management hypothesis, they find that
there is a higher-than-expected frequency of firms exhibiting slightly positive earnings (or
earnings growth) and a lower-than-expected frequency of firms exhibiting slightly negative
earnings (or earnings growth). Their results indicate that the distribution approach is quite
effective in detecting earnings management at the relevant thresholds.
A main advantage of the distribution approach is that it can capture the effects of earnings
management without estimating the noisy, abnormal accruals. This is particularly meaning-
ful for a study of China because most firms were listed after 1994. This short history makes
time-series-based accrual estimation difficult. In addition, there are many non-listed major
firms in almost all industries. Since data are generally not available for non-listed firms, this
makes cross-section-based (or industry-adjusted) accrual estimates troublesome as well.
The disadvantages of the distribution approach, as pointed out by Healy and Wahlen
(1999), are that it captures neither the magnitude of earnings management nor the specific
methods by which earnings are managed. However, we try to solve these problems in this
study by using the truncated distribution to infer the distribution without earnings manage-
ment and thus to estimate the pervasiveness or magnitude of earnings management. We
also try to identify whether the non-core income is the major means used in earnings man-
agement by comparing the distributions between the total income and the core income.3. Incentives for earnings management and ROE thresholds for rights issues
China’s listed firms are likely to have stronger incentives than firms in other countries to
conduct earnings management, especially to meet regulatory requirements to raise new
equity capital in the stock market. This is largely due to China’s approach to privatization.
China started its economic reform in 1979 and established the stock market in the early
1990s. Almost all listed firms in China are former state-owned enterprises (SOEs). During
the period of central planning, they received all the funding allocated directly from gov-
ernment financial reserves and turned in all their profits to the state. Beginning in the early
1980s, SOEs were required to pay taxes instead of turning in profits. On the other hand,
the funding for SOE capital investments had to come through bank loans. This change, to
a certain extent, relieved the government’s financial burden and made SOEs more cautious
in the use of capital. Unfortunately, this also led to the huge ‘‘triangular debt’’ problem
which plagued most SOEs in the 1990s.6 One aim in transforming SOEs into listed firms
was to inject new equity capital into these companies (Mookerjee and Yu, 1999). Unlike
privatization in other countries, where government sells the equity in SOEs to the public6 See Sun and Tong (2003).
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companies to raise new equity in the stock market. In addition, up until 2000, China had a
unique and restrictive IPO quota system (Sun et al., 2005). As a result, firms usually can-
not raise enough capital through their IPOs.
Furthermore, due to the lack of effective reform in the corporate governance structure
and relatively unfavourable operating conditions, the performance of many listed firms
has not been improved by these reforms.7 As a matter of fact, the overall profitability
of listed firms measured by ROA and ROE has deteriorated over the period of 1994–
2002. In order to sustain or expand their operations, firms have needed to raise new cap-
ital. Since the corporate debt market was virtually non-existent until recently and as bank
loans restrict firms in many ways, managers prefer to raise new equity capital rather than
to borrow. Since the corporate governance is poor and agency problems are serious, listed
firms feel little pressure or incentive to issue cash dividends. Therefore, rights issues are the
most important avenue for raising additional equity capital. In fact, most listed firms have
had rights issues within three years of their listing.8
Managers’ incentives for earnings management are enhanced by the fact that Chinese
stock investors are relatively unsophisticated (Bailey, 1994) and they may not be able to
see through earnings management. In addition, the auditing profession in China is not
up to international standards (Aharony et al., 2000). The lack of an effective auditing
system can further foster earnings management.
Repeatedly, CSRC has set and changed the standards for listed firms to issue rights, as
shown in Panel A of Table 1. In 1993, firms were required to have only two consecutive
years of profits before they could issue rights. In September 1994, CSRC specified, for
the first time, that a firm must have an average ROE of more than 10% in the previous
three years before it could issue rights. In January 1996, CSRC toughened the require-
ment, stating that a firm must have more than 10% ROE for each of the previous three
years. CSRC then lowered the standard in March 1999, requiring that firms have an aver-
age ROE above 10% in the past three years but not lower than 6% in any of these years. In
March 2001, CSRC further lowered the standard, stating that firms must have an average
ROE above 6% in the past three years.9
As discussed previously, we believe that managers would have had a strong incentive to
manipulate their earnings to address the rights issue thresholds, specifically, at the 10%
level for the period 1994–1998, both at the 6% and 10% levels for the period 1999–
2000, and at the 6% level for the period 2001–2002.
In Panel B of Table 1, we further present the number of rights issues across our sample
years. There are altogether 770 rights issues from 1994 to 2002. According to year, 156
issues occurred in 1997, the highest during our sample period, while only 20 rights issues7 See Lin et al. (1998) for a discussion of four major problems faced by SOEs.
8 Seasoned issues are allowed but were much more difficult to get approved during our sample period.
9 The ROE requirement for seasoned issues is identical to that of rights issues. There was no formal requirement
for convertible bond issues until 1997. CSRC required that a firm must have an average ROE of more than 10% in
the previous three years before it could issue convertible bonds. The ROE requirement has not been changed since
then. The 10% requirement is the same as that of rights issues up to the beginning of 2001. After 2001, the
requirement for rights issues is 6%, which is different from the 10% requirement for convertible issues. However,
the amount of convertibles issued during our sample period is very limited. In 2002, only five firms issued a total
of RMB4.1 billion. This amount is already more than the total amount raised via convertible bonds in the
previous 10 years.
Table 1
Rights issue requirements: This table summarizes the regulations issued by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) regarding rights issues during the period 1994–2002
Regulation date ROE requirement Limit on rights issues
Panel A: rights issue requirements
September 28, 1994 Must be profitable in each of the previous
three years, and the three-year average ROE
must be greater than 10%. However, for firms
in the sectors of energy, raw materials and
infrastructure, the average ROE can be a little
lower
The total number of new shares
resulting from the rights issues
must be less than 30 percent of
the existing tradable shares,
with at least a one-year interval




ROE must be greater than 10% in each of the
previous three years. For firms in the sectors
of energy, raw materials and infrastructure,
the ROE should be greater than 9% in each of
the previous three years
Explicitly specify that 30% of
existing shares is based on
existing shares excluding those
issued as stock dividends
March 17,
1999
Three-year average ROE must be greater than
10%. For firms in the sectors of energy, raw
materials and infrastructure, the three-year
average ROE must be greater than 9%.
However, in any of the previous three years,




Three-year average ROE must be greater than
6% and the expected ROE for the year of
rights issue should also be greater than 6%
Thirty percent limit can be
waived if the actual control
shareholders buy all the new
shares
No. of listed firms No. of firms
issued rights
No. of firms eligible
to issue rights
Issued as a percentage
of eligible (%)
Panel B: number of rights issues across years
1994 287 46 n.a. n.a.
1995 311 68 n.a. n.a.
1996 513 48 75 64.0
1997 720 156 166 94.0
1998 826 125 240 52.1
1999 924 116 185 62.7
2000 1060 108 148 73.0
2001 1136 83 228 36.4
2002 1199 20 153 13.1
It also presents the rights issue statistics for the same period.
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a percentage of firms that met the CSRC requirement for rights issues during the period
1996–2000 ranges from 13.1% in 2002 to 94% in 1997.
4. Earnings management at thresholds
Following BD (1997) and DPZ (1999), we assume that the cross-sectional distribution
of ROE is relatively smooth in the absence of earnings management. However, if manag-
ers engage in earnings management in response to the ROE thresholds, such as the min-
imum 10% requirement set by CSRC for rights issuing, distributions of reported ROE will
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unusually high frequencies of firms, just above it.
To examine if any earnings management exists at the ROE thresholds, as specified in
the previous section, we collect annual ROE data across all listed firms (either on SHSE
or SZSE) over the period 1994–2002 from the CSMAR database and company financial
reports. To distinguish our study from the IPO earnings management, we exclude the
ROE data in the listing year.10 We also exclude firms with missing data. Our final samples
consist of 5921 observations.11 A weakness of this dataset is its relatively small sample size
which may make our inference less convincing relative to that shown in Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999).12 However, the small sample size may also make
our results more impressive because there has to be a strong effect for patterns to emerge to
the level of statistical significance.13
Since the ROE requirements for rights issues were changed in March 1999 and again in
March 2001, we divide the whole sample into three sub-samples in our study: 1975 obser-
vations for the period 1994–1998, 1748 for the period 1999–2000, and 2198 for the period
2001–2002.14 The three sub-samples are plotted in Panels A–C of Fig. 1, respectively. The
horizontal axis indicates ROE, while the vertical axis indicates the number of firms corre-
sponding to each ROE percentage interval. It is obvious that there are some outliers. How-
ever, we do not exclude them because our focus is on the distribution around the 6% and
10% ROE thresholds, which is not affected by the outliers.
A casual observation shows that the non-smoothness occurs at the relevant thresholds.
In Panel A, we see that the frequencies are unusually high just above 10% and zero, but
unusually low just below these two points. The non-smoothness at 10% is consistent with
our hypothesis that firms engage in earnings management at this threshold to ensure rights10 Teoh et al. (1998) and DuCharme et al. (2001) have documented that firms heavily engaged in earnings
management in the year of IPO.
11 Excluding a few firms with a lower ROE requirement for rights issues in the sectors of energy, raw materials
and infrastructure during the period 1996–2000 does not generate qualitatively different results.
12 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) samples consist of 70,000 and 100,000 observations,
respectively.
13 Our test statistics at the relevant thresholds as shown in Table 2 are all significant at 5% or better.















































































Fig. 1. Sample distributions: This figure shows the distribution of 1975 observations for the period 1994–1998,
1748 observations for the period 1999–2000, and 2198 observations for the period 2001–2002, respectively. The
vertical axis indicates the number of firms or frequency, while the horizontal axis indicates the return on equity
(ROE) in percent.
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because it is also a threshold for firms. Previous studies have provided consistent evidence
that managers have the incentive to engage in earnings management in order to report
positive earnings (see BD and DPZ). However, the zero threshold is not our focus.
In Panel B, we see that there is non-smoothness at the 10% and 6% levels. This is con-
sistent with the changed ROE requirement for rights issues in 1999, which still required
that the three-year average ROE before rights issues should be higher than 10%, but
the ROE could be as low as 6% in one or two of the three years. In Panel C, we see that
non-smoothness occurs at the 6% level. This, again, is consistent with the further change in
the ROE requirement to the three-year average above 6% in 2001.
We also develop a t-statistic (see Appendix) to test the statistical significance of the
smoothness for 17 different percentage points in the ROE distribution, namely,
ROE = 2, 3, . . .18%. As shown in Table 2, for the period 1994–1998, our t-test statistics
reject the null hypothesis that the distribution is smooth at ROE = 10–12%. Notice that
all these points are close to the 10% threshold for this period. This indicates that Chi-
nese-listed firms engaged in earnings management to meet the 10% requirement for rights
issues during 1994–1998.
The test for the period 1999–2000 is capable of capturing the change in ROE require-
ments for rights issues in 1999. The t-statistics reject smoothness of the ROE distribution
at 6%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, and 12%.
The significant t-statistic at ROE = 6% is consistent with the new 6 percent threshold
resulting from the change in regulating rights issues in 1999. Although the 1999 regulation
still requires the three-year average ROE to be greater than 10%, the economic situation
was not good, due to the Asian economic crisis. Therefore, many firms may only have had
the capability to manage earnings to meet the minimum requirement of 6% specified in the
1999 regulation change. This also can explain why the smoothness hypothesis was rejectedTable 2
Test results on smoothness of the ROE distribution: This table presents the t-test statistics on smoothness of the
ROE distribution at various points
ROE (%) 1994–1998 1999–2000 2001–2002
2 0.943 0.461 10.759**
3 0.306 1.867 1.566
4 1.650 0.623 1.934
5 1.780 1.993 1.989
6 0.985 5.505 7.097**
7 1.275 1.085 3.530**
8 1.413 10.570** 2.379**
9 0.081 4.597** 5.475**
10 5.623** 7.134** 1.967
11 3.012** 5.277** 1.436
12 2.263** 3.328** 0.849
13 1.340 0.914 3.496**
14 0.936 1.851 1.859
15 1.758 1.957 1.820
16 0.080 1.736 1.966
17 0.968 0.363 1.507
18 0.288 1.952 1.845
** Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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10% was still required until early 2001.
Similarly, the results for the period 2001–2002 show that our method is able to capture
the change in ROE requirements for rights issues in 2001. Consistent with the requirement
change, the t-statistics reject smoothness of the ROE distribution at 6%, 7%, 8%, 9% and
13%. The significant t-statistics at ROE = 6%, 7%, 8%, and 9% are consistent with the 6%
threshold. However, the significant t-statistic at 13% is not consistent with any identifiable
threshold.15
Overall, the results reported in Table 2 confirm the observations presented in Fig. 1 that
listed firms in China engaged in earnings management at the 6% and/or 10% ROE thres-
holds to meet the requirements for rights issues.
5. The pervasiveness of earnings management at the thresholds
In addition to examining whether there is any earnings management at the threshold,
we also analyze the pervasiveness of the earnings management. The pervasiveness refers
to the percentage of firms in a sub-sample at or around the threshold that engages in earn-
ings management. In order to measure the pervasiveness of the earnings management, we
need to compare the observed number of firms at some small interval just above (and
below) the threshold in the presence of earnings management with the expected number
of firms at the same interval in the absence of earnings management. Therefore, the key
is to find the ROE distribution in the absence of earnings management.
Since all listed firms face the same macroeconomic and regulatory environment, the
ROE variability among firms is mainly determined by firm-specific factors. We, therefore,
assume that, in the absence of earnings management, ROE is normally distributed, i.e.,
ROE  N[l, r2]. If there is neither motive nor evidence for earnings management beyond
a certain point of the actual ROE distribution, we can just truncate the distribution at that
point and assume that the truncated part (the distribution right to the truncation point) is
normally distributed. Then, we can further infer the mean and variance of the whole ROE
distribution in the absence of earnings management from the truncated distribution (see
Greene, 1990), and thus, restore the whole distribution.
As mentioned before, the CSRC requires a firm to have a greater than 10% ROE for the
past three years before it can raise new capital via rights issues. It is not too unreasonable
to expect that beyond a certain point, ROE > b, where b is a point reasonably greater than
the 10% threshold, managers have no incentive to engage in earnings management. This is
because the management compensation scheme described in Healy (1985) did not exist in
China during our sample period, and thus, managers did not have the incentive to maxi-
mize their overall compensation by under-reporting the current year’s earnings. Even if
they did, there is no reason to assume such earnings management would be concentrated
at any particular threshold.
A truncated normal distribution is a part of a non-truncated normal distribution. From
the former, we can infer the latter. The expectation of the truncated distribution (the part
with no earnings management) is
EðROEjROE > bÞ ¼ lþ r/ðaÞ=f1 UðaÞg; ð1Þ15 We also apply the BD and DPZ methods and both reject smoothness at ROE = 13%, also.
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a ¼ ðb lÞ=r; ð2Þ
U(a) is the standard normal accumulative distribution function or the degree of trunca-
tion, namely, the probability of ROE < b. As b increases, this probability increases, and
a larger part of the distribution is abandoned. /(a) is the standard normal probability den-
sity function. Once the b is determined, we can derive /(a), U(a) and a (=U1(a)). Then, we
can further solve the system of Eqs. (1) and (2) for l and r, the mean and standard devi-
ation of the restored ROE distribution with no earnings management.
Thus, the above method can help us compute the pervasiveness of earnings manage-
ment. By comparing the observed ROE distribution and the expected ROE distribution
with no earnings management, we can obtain the number of firms engaging in earnings
management as a percentage of the firms that should fall just below or above the threshold
in the absence of earnings management. Although rough, this can provide some indication
of the pervasiveness of earnings management.
We see in Table 2 that from ROE = 15% onwards, the smoothness of the distribution
cannot be rejected for the 1994–1998, 1999–2000 and 2001–2002 samples. Since truncating
the distribution at different points may lead to different restored normal distributions, we
compute three restored distributions based on truncating points at 16%, 17% and 18%,
respectively, and choose the one with the best fit to the actual distribution. The best fit
ROE distribution versus the actual ROE distribution for the 1994–1998, 1999–2000,
and 2001–2002 periods are plotted in Fig. 2(a)–(c), respectively.
Fig. 2(a) clearly shows that the frequencies in the actual distribution are significantly
higher than the expected ones at the intervals 10–11%, 11–12% and 12–13%, but lower
at the intervals between 2% and 10% and the intervals below zero. This is generally con-
sistent with our previous findings that firms with ROE lower than the thresholds engage in
earnings management to boost the ROE above the thresholds.
Fig. 2(b) also shows that the frequencies in the actual distribution are higher than the
expected distribution above the 6% threshold, but lower below the threshold. However,
the frequencies of the actual distribution are higher than the expected distribution from
6% until 13%, although the frequency at the 10–11% interval is the highest within this
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Fig. 2. Expected versus actual distribution: This figure shows the actual distribution of observations versus the
expected distribution inferred from the truncated distribution for the periods 1994–1998 (1975 observations),
1999–2000 (1748 observations), and 2001–2002 (2198 observations), respectively. The vertical axis indicates the
number of firms, or frequency, while the horizontal axis indicates the return on equity (ROE) in percent.
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our restored normal distribution may not be a good representation of the true distribution
in the absence of earnings management.
However, we have a more plausible explanation. The three-year average ROE require-
ment for rights issues was in transition during this period, from 10% to 6%. The higher
than expected frequency of the ROE distribution from 7% to 9% may have resulted from
a mixing of earnings management to meet the two different thresholds, ROE = 6% and
10% during 1999–2000. As mentioned earlier, although a three-year average greater than
10% was still required in 1999 and 2000, the adverse impact of the Asian economic crisis,
and the severe deflation experienced in China during those years, made it impossible for
many firms to manage their earnings to reach the 10% threshold. Instead, these firms
turned to managed earnings to meet the minimum requirement: ROE greater than 6%.
However, some firms were still able to manage their earnings to be greater than the
10% level.16
Fig. 2(c) shows that the frequencies in the actual distribution are higher than the
expected distribution above the 6% threshold, but lower below the threshold. Consistent
with the 6% ROE requirement during the period 2001–2002, there is no spike around
ROE = 10%.
From the differences between the actual and expected ROE distributions, we compute
the percentage of firms engaged in earnings management to be near the 10% and 6%
thresholds. Table 3 presents the results for the 1994–1998, 1999–2000, and 2001–2002 peri-
ods in Panels A–C, respectively.
From Panel A, we see that the expected number of firms falling in the 10–11% interval
should be 87, but the actual number of firms in the interval is 377. This suggests that an
excess of 290 firms managed to report their ROE in this interval, which is 333% of the
expected number of firms or 14.7% of the whole distribution during the period 1994–
1998. Earnings management is very pervasive at this threshold! The number of firms
engaged in earnings management is 109% for the 11–12% interval, which is also quite high.
Yet the negative sign for the intervals below the threshold indicates that the actual number
of firms in these intervals is lower than expected. The shortage is 35%, 48%, and 17% for
ROE intervals of 7–8%, 8–9% and 9–10%, respectively. A similar pattern can be observed
around the 10% and 6% thresholds in Panel B and the 6% threshold in Panel C. In 1999–
2000, 205% and 117% of the expected number of firms at the interval 10–11% and 6–7%,
respectively (or 7.4% and 5.5% of the whole distribution) engage in earnings management.
Furthermore, 96% of the expected number of firms (or 6.3% of the whole distribution)
engage in earnings management at the 6–7% interval in 2001–2002.
Since our assumption of a normal distribution may be too simplistic to capture the real-
ity, these estimates on pervasiveness may not be very accurate. Particularly, very few
observations appear for ROE < 0. As an alternative, we further truncate the restored dis-
tribution at ROE = 0 and use that as the benchmark distribution without earnings man-16 We have also examined the data for individual years from 1999 to 2002. We find that the 10% threshold is a bit
more obvious for 1999 data, while the 6% threshold dominates from 2001. However, for 2000 data, both 6% and
10% seem to be thresholds. This is consistent with the rights issue requirement change during this period. Since
the sample size is small for individual years, it makes the restoration of the normal distribution less reliable.
Therefore, we do not want to make strong inferences from these findings. The results are not reported to save
space, but are available upon request.
Table 3
The pervasiveness of earnings management around the 10% or 6% ROE threshold: This table presents the
estimated frequency of the firms that engage in earnings management just around the 10% and 6% ROE
thresholds






% of firms engaged
in EM (%)
Panel A: 1994–1998
2–3 80 61 19 (24)
3–4 85 46 39 (46)
4–5 89 47 42 (47)
5–6 92 58 34 (37)
6–7 93 71 22 (24)
7–8 94 61 33 (35)
8–9 93 48 45 (48)
9–10 90 75 15 (17)
10–11 87 377 290 333
11–12 82 171 89 109
12–13 77 113 36 47
13–14 71 75 4 6
Panel B: 1999–2000
2–3 86 75 11 (13)
3–4 87 46 41 (47)
4–5 87 45 42 (48)
5–6 86 28 58 (67)
6–7 83 180 97 117
7–8 79 116 37 47
8–9 74 129 55 74
9–10 69 120 51 74
10–11 63 192 129 205
11–12 56 113 57 102
12–13 50 79 29 58
13–14 43 65 22 51
Panel C: 2001–2002
2–3 137 130 7 (5)
3–4 145 145 0 0
4–5 149 133 16 (11)
5–6 149 129 20 (13)
6–7 144 282 138 96
7–8 136 173 37 27
8–9 125 134 9 7
9–10 111 112 1 1
10–11 96 103 7 7
11–12 80 76 4 (5)
12–13 65 69 4 6
13–14 52 31 21 (40)
The expected number of firms with no EM is based on the distribution inferred from the truncated distribution,
which is assumed normal. The number of firms engaged in EM in a particular interval is the difference between
the actual number of firms and the expected number of firms in the interval. The percentage of the firms engage in
EM is derived by dividing the difference between the actual and the expected number of firms by the expected
number of the firms in the interval.
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Fig. 3. Expected versus actual distribution: This figure shows the actual distribution of observations versus the
expected distribution inferred from the truncated distribution for the periods 1994–1998 (1975 observations),
1999–2000 (1748 observations), and 2001–2002 (2198 observations), respectively. The expected distribution is
truncated at zero. The vertical axis indicates the number of firms, or frequency, while the horizontal axis indicates
the return on equity (ROE) in percent.
Q. Yu et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 3453–3468 3465agement. Then, we re-compute the pervasiveness of earnings management around various
thresholds. Fig. 3 presents the graphical distributions of expected and actual ROE for the
three sample periods.
In general, the pattern is similar to those presented in Fig. 2. However, the pervasive-
ness of earnings management at the relevant thresholds is less severe. This is within the
expectation because the truncation at ROE = 0 shifts up the distribution curve.17 The per-
vasiveness of earnings management derived from such a truncated curve is more conser-
vative than the previous restored normal distribution curve. We re-compute the
percentage of firms engaged in earnings management near the 10% and 6% thresholds
as presented in Table 3 for the three sample periods. For the period of 1994–1998, the per-
centages of firms engaged in earnings management in the intervals 10–11% and 11–12%
are 234% and 60%, respectively, are much lower than the corresponding percentages,
333% and 109%, in Panel A of Table 3. For the periods 1999–2000 and 2001–2002, 59%
and 57% of firms engage in earnings management at the interval, 6–7%, respectively,
and the corresponding percentages for the same periods reported in Table 3 are 117%
and 96%. To save space, we do not report all the results here.
Although our estimation may not be very accurate, we do believe these estimates pro-
vide some useful indications of the possible range of the pervasiveness of earnings manage-
ment among Chinese-listed firms.
6. Non-core income as a means for earnings management
One shortcoming associated with the distribution approach is that it cannot tell us
which accounting items are used in earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
However, Chen and Yuan (2004) document that earnings management in China is mainly
reflected in non-core income. Therefore, as a simple check, we further plot the distribution
of the normal ROE versus the distribution of the core ROE. If the non-core ROE is the
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Fig. 4. Sample distributions: This figure shows the distribution of the normal ROE (total net income divided by
the total equity) versus the distribution of the core ROE (core net income divided by the total equity) for the
periods 1994–1998 (1975 observations), 1999–2000 (1748 observations), and 2001–2002 (2198 observations),
respectively. The vertical axis indicates the number of firms, or frequency, while the horizontal axis indicates the
core and normal (ROE) in percent.
3466 Q. Yu et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 3453–3468is equal to the normal ROE minus the non-core ROE, should not exhibit big spikes at the
thresholds.18
Fig. 4 shows the normal versus the core ROE distribution for the three sample periods
in Panels A–C, respectively. It is very striking that the core ROE distribution is much
smoother than the normal ROE distribution. As shown in Panels A and C, the spikes
at the 10% and 6% percent thresholds for the periods 1994–1998 and 2001–2002 disappear
totally. The spikes at both the 10% and 6% thresholds shown in Panel B are much smaller
than those shown for the normal ROE distribution. These plots in Fig. 4 are consistent
with the findings of Chen and Yuan (2004) and lend further support to the view that
the non-core income in China directly reflects the extent of earnings management.
7. Conclusion
China’s listed firms were required to exceed thresholds of 6% and 10% ROE before they
were allowed to have rights issues for the period 1994–2002. We show that earnings man-
agement at these thresholds was very pervasive and that non-core income was the major
means used in such earnings management. These findings have policy implications for
CSRC and general implications for investors.
Our statistical methods employ a distribution approach that is both simple and intui-
tive, and can be broadly applied, e.g., in examining responses to any grading or regulatory
system.
Appendix. Test Statistics
As a modification of BD and DPZ, we define that an ROE distribution at a point is
smooth if, and only if, the first order derivative of the probability density function exists
at that point. Mathematically, this means that the left derivative should be equal to the
right derivative at the point. Let x and f(x) be the variable of interest, such as ROE,
and the probability density function of ROE, respectively. Given a random sample of x
of size N, we estimate the density for discretely ordered and equispaced points: x0,18 We thank a referee for suggesting this to us. Please see footnote 2 for the definition of non-core ROE.
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[x0, x1), [x1, x2), . . . , [xn, xn+1), and so on. These proportions, denoted p(x), provide
estimates of f(x) at x0, x1, . . . ,xn, etc. Applying the Taylor expansion at x0, the threshold,
re-arranging terms, and lumping together higher order terms into the residual, e, we can
obtain the following equations for regressions:
fpðx0 þ DxÞ  pðx0Þg=Dx ¼ a0 þ b0Dxþ eðDx! x0 from leftÞ; ðA1Þ
fpðx0 þ DxÞ  pðx0Þg=Dx ¼ aþ0 þ bþ0Dxþ eðDx! x0 from rightÞ; ðA2Þ
where Dx = x  x0. Since p(x), the estimate of f(x), is not really continuous, we may not
be able to get the limit when Dx goes to zero. Operationally, therefore, Dx must be a
multiple of the equispaced interval (or bin). Corresponding to each Dx, we compute
{p(x0 + Dx)  p(x0)}/Dx. As Dx tends to zero, the intercepts a0 and a+0, can be used
to proxy the left and right derivatives, respectively. If the distribution is smooth at x0,
the right derivative should be equal to the left derivative, which implies that the differ-
ence between the two intercepts should not be statistically different from zero. The t-sta-
tistic is constructed by using the regression intercepts and their corresponding standard
errors:
t ¼ a0  aþ0ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
s2aþ0 þ s2a0
q ; ðA3Þ
where sa+0 and sa0 are the standard errors of a+0 and a0, respectively, and can be di-
rectly obtained from regressions of Eqs. (A1) and (A2).References
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